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I. Introduction
On first examination, open source software seems paradoxical. Open source software is a
public good provided by volunteers—the “source code” used to generate the programs is freely
available, hence “open source.” Networks of thousands of volunteers have developed widely used
products such as the GNU/Linux operating system and the Apache web server. Moreover, these
are highly complex products and they are, arguably, of better quality than competing commercial
products, suggesting that open source provision may be highly efficient. This appears to counter
the common economic intuition that private agents, without property rights, will not invest
sufficient effort in the development of public goods because of free-rider externalities.
Much of the initial research exploring this apparent paradox has focused on the
motivations of individual programmers. Lerner and Tirole (2002) attribute much individual
motivation to reputation building and career concerns. Harhoff et al. (2000) consider other
individual motivations. Johnson (2000) and Kuan (2000) model individual user/developers with
common needs but with heterogeneous valuations and abilities.
But it has become increasingly apparent that firms, and not just individuals, play an
important role. Many large firms such as IBM, HP, Computer Associates and Novell have
dedicated substantial resources to Free/Open Source software (FOSS) development. Although
some of these firms may contribute for strategic reasons (e.g., IBM’s Linux effort undercuts rival
Microsoft), the software plays no such strategic role for many firms (i.e., few of the firms
contributing Linux are direct Microsoft competitors).1 Indeed, many firms in the embedded
software business (software embedded in electronic devices) contribute code to Embedded Linux
even though this is a core part of their business (Henkel and Tins, 2004). And surveys show that
about half of the entire development effort on FOSS projects is performed by programmers at work
with the knowledge of their supervisors (Lakhani and Wolf, 2003).2
This paper asks whether there is a sound economic reason why firms contribute to FOSS
development even when proprietary products are available from non-rival firms. This inquiry may
reveal something about the limits of effective proprietary provision. Also, it may help explain why
1

For many of these firms, Free/Open Source software complements other products and services that the firm

offers on a proprietary basis, but the FOSS projects don’t play a strategic role against direct rivals.
2

Lakhani and Wolf find that 38% of programmers contribute to FOSS at work with the knowledge of their

supervisors (another 17% contribute at work without the knowledge of their supervisors), but these
programmers contribute about 50% more hours than others.
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FOSS appears so robust in some markets, with FOSS products successfully challenging wellfunded proprietary products in areas such as web servers (Apache), server operating systems
(Linux) and embedded systems (embedded Linux). This success and the continued rapid growth of
FOSS developers and projects3 seem hard to reconcile with a movement based solely on
programmers’ reputations and similar personal motivations.
I begin with a version of Aghion and Tirole’s model of innovation (1994) adapted to a
setting where customers for software innovations may also develop software. Aghion and Tirole’s
model concerns the problem of designing a contract or an allocation of ownership rights that elicits
a socially efficient allocation of effort (or other unobservable investments) from the two parties. A
key result is that proprietary provision—either through contracting or through a simple allocation
of property rights—may be socially inefficient when a complete contract cannot be written for an
innovation, that is, the innovation is ex ante indescribable.4 Contracting over software generally
has this difficulty: the software code itself is the complete description of how the software will
function in every circumstance and, consequently, writing a contract that covers every contingency
costs roughly the same as writing the software itself. Practical contracts for software will thus not
completely specify all details, interactions and contingencies.
This difficulty arises from the complexity of software. Typical software products have
large numbers of features and the number of possible interactions between these features can be
astronomical. A “successful” software innovation tailors these interactions so that the software
performs well for a customer’s needs. The role of complexity has been recognized in the
economics literature on contracting (Segal, 1999, Hart and Moore, 1999, Tirole, 1999) and
complex contingencies is described as a source of high transaction costs more generally.
Building on this line of thought, a key insight of this paper is that the structure of this
complexity also gives rise to mechanisms that can overcome the inefficiencies of proprietary
software provision, at least partially. During the early decades of the computer industry, almost all
software was either developed by the customers themselves or developed under individual
contracts, often with the computer manufacturer. A series of organizational innovations, however,
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SourceForge, one website where many FOSS project and participants register, 900,000 participants and

86,000 projects (8/2004) and continues to grow.
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Other necessary conditions are that innovative effort is also non-contractible, ex post renegotiation cannot

be ruled out and there is a single customer.
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have allowed the software industry to evolve more sophisticated (and presumably socially
preferable) mechanisms to provide software.
The first innovation, pre-packaged software, works by combining a select group of
features in a pre-programmed bundle. Multiple customers can then purchase this bundle in
efficient arm’s-length transactions. I show that this form of proprietary provision is socially
efficient for those customer’s whose needs are met by the features in the bundle. However, in
sufficiently complex environments, many customers’ needs will not be adequately addressed by
pre-packaged software. Pre-packaged software firms can also produce customized versions for
some of these customers under contract, but I show below that this does not generate socially
efficient outcomes.
A second innovation that allows pre-packaged software firms to more efficiently address
some specialized needs is the applications program interface (API). The API is an example of what
Katz and von Hippel (2002) call a “toolkit for customer innovation” (see also Thomke and von
Hippel). In a situation where a pre-packaged software product includes some, but not all, of the
features a customer needs, the software firm also sells the tools to access functions performed by
the code. Using these functions, a customer can reduce the effort needed to develop the software
themselves. The API does allow more efficient innovation for some customers, but some
customers are priced out of the market at the software firm’s optimal price for the API.
Free/Open Source software development provides yet additional social welfare gains.
With FOSS, customers can use publicly shared source code instead of an API. This reduces their
required development effort as above. Because the code is freely available, even firms priced out
of the market for the API can develop more efficiently. Moreover, because these firms share their
code in turn, the base of available code can grow far greater than the code available in commercial
APIs, allowing far more complex applications to be developed efficiently.
In this sense, FOSS is not an alternative to proprietary development, but a complement; it
extends the market. In this model, FOSS does not displace a pre-packaged software monopolist,
although the monopolist will charge lower prices and will lose API sales. Instead, pre-packaged
software is sold for simpler applications used by large numbers of customers. Firms with
specialized needs and more complex applications use FOSS.
This highly stylized model appears to provide a simple explanation for several observed
features of software markets: the emergence and growth of the pre-packaged software segment as
the markets grew in size; the persistence of self-development and contract programming despite
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this growth; the development of APIs; the coexistence of proprietary and FOSS development with
successful FOSS projects tending to more complex, “geekier” applications.
The apparent paradox about efficient provision of a public good posed above is resolved
because software is not a simple public good; it is instead a complex public good, used in many
different applications by highly heterogeneous users. The next section formally models this notion
of complexity and the difficulty of contracting for software development. Section III applies this
simple model to pre-packaged software, and APIs, section IV to FOSS. Section V concludes.

II. Background
The cost of complexity
Why are software programs complex? They typically include many features that work
together to meet heterogeneous needs. Because consumers have different preferences for each
feature in a complex product, they use different combinations of features. This differs from simple
commodities because, in effect, the customer consumes only a specific instance (the “useproduct”) of the general product the firm sells. The firm sells a product with m optional features
that may or may not be used with each other. This represents 2 m different use-products (assuming
a binary enumeration), of which only one may be of interest to any given consumer.
This distinction creates a real economic difference when the firm faces a cost, even a
slight cost, for each use-product. And indeed, the quality of software depends on the extent to
which different use-product combinations are worked out, tested and debugged. Because the
features in a complex software program interact with each other, each use-product must be
individually tested to ensure that it works. Yet firms cannot feasibly test all possible use-products
because the number of possible combinations is astronomical.5 For example, Cusumano and Selby
(1995, p. 310) describe the complexity facing Microsoft’s operating systems:
The many testing approaches Microsoft uses to evaluate products prior to release are still
insufficient to detect all errors due to the very large number of combinations of product usage
scenarios that can occur. The various commands, data inputs, and underlying system
configurations can cause a possibly infinite number of combinations. For example, assume the
following: A systems product has 100 features. Each feature has 1 normal execution
completion and 2 error messages it could generate. The product runs on 20 different vendors’
5

If a product had 100 independent features and each combination took only one second to test, then the job

could not be finished before the sun is predicted to swallow the earth even if every human currently alive
spent every second until then testing.
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disk drives. It should run in 4, 8, 16, or 32 megabyte (MB) of memory. The product should
run with 15 different vendors’ printers, and 5 different vendors’ video cards. It should support
100 of the most popular applications and the 50 most frequently used commands for each of
these applications. In order to simply begin testing this product, testers would have to set up a
lab that could support over 9 billion combinations of usage scenarios (because 100 x 3 x 20 x
4 x 15 x 5 x 100 x 50 is equal to more than 9 billion). Even if such a lab were practical, it
would not be cost-effective—and this list of combinations is incomplete by far.
This complexity has at least three consequences: it affects the way pre-packaged software
companies develop their products, it causes pre-packaged software firms to limit the number of
features in their products, and it drives up the cost of specifying customized contracts.
To limit costs associated with the interaction of features, software firms build products
using “structured code” and “object-oriented” regimens that help reduce interactions and help
locate incorrect interactions that cause bugs. Firms also use a wide variety of testing techniques,
including automated testing (Cusumano and Selby, 1995, chapter 5). And they provide partially
debugged code to limited groups of customers for “beta” testing (Cusumano and Selby, 1995, p.
310). Also, they do not test exhaustively; rather, products are released when bug discovery rates
fall below a specified level.
Nevertheless, complexity insures that most of the cost of software arises from testing,
debugging and customer maintenance (that is, fixing bugs or providing work-arounds after product
release), not from the original design and coding. One study found that testing, debugging and
maintenance account for 82% of the cost of software (Cusumano, 1991, p. 65). In 1995, Microsoft
employed 3,900 engineers for testing and customer support (Cusumano and Selby, 1995, p. 51).
Yet it only employed 1,850 software design engineers and these split their time between initial
coding and debugging.
Complexity-related costs also limit the ability of packaged software to meet all consumer
needs and some consumers turn to custom programming and self-development. In the 1950’s and
60’s, owning a computer almost always meant either self-developing or contracting custom
software development. Proprietary software consisted of limited applications that were almost
entirely sold bundled with computer hardware. Little packaged software was sold until the 1970’s
(Parker and Grimm, 2000), when IBM was challenged by private and government lawsuits to
unbundle, and when mini-computers became widely used. As Figure 1 shows, pre-packaged
software has grown, especially with the dramatic expansion of the computer market with low cost
personal computers beginning in the 1980s (Parker and Grimm, 2000).
This growth in market share has been accompanied by dramatic growth in product
complexity. Competing software firms, attempting to reach ever-larger markets, engage in “feature
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wars,” adding large numbers of new features to product revisions, encouraging upgrades and
hoping to increase market share. The result is an intense pressure to add new features. This
growing complexity is evident in five Microsoft product upgrades that occurred during the late
80’s and early 90’s (Cusumano and Selby, 1995, p. 224 and 246). The number of lines of source
code in each product grew substantially from one version to the next, the increases ranging from
31% to 109%.
Yet despite this rapid growth in features and despite the implied rapid acceleration in
debugging, testing and maintenance costs, pre-packaged software appears to have reached some
significant limits—it has failed to account for as much as 30% of total software investment.
Despite the common view that Microsoft is the prototypical software company, most software
investment involves self-developed software or contract programming and neither Microsoft nor
the other pre-packaged software companies have been able to adequately address the needs of a
substantial portion of the market.
When standardized software packages fail to meet such specialized needs, users develop
their own software or contract with someone else to develop it for them, as the figure shows.
Frequently, a user does not need to code an entire program from scratch, but can utilize
“developer’s toolkits” for packaged software.
An alternative approach is for users to modify a Free/Open Source program. A key feature
of FOSS is that the code is available for users to freely modify—this is the sense in which the code
is “free,” not so much that the software has nominal price of zero.6 This feature is significant,
because open source advocates claim that this provides a substantial advantage in developing
complex software products of high quality (Raymond).
A brief look at one FOSS product, the Apache web server, illustrates the importance of
specialized needs not addressed by competing pre-packaged software products. The Apache server
6

As Richard Stallman famously says, Free Software is “free as in free speech, not as in free beer.” Copyleft

software requires modifications of the code to be shared if they are distributed, thus ensuring a dynamic code
base. License agreements for “open source” software do not have this requirement, but nevertheless code
modifications are frequently shared. This occurs for two reasons. First, strong community norms support free
re-distribution—few programmers want to contribute code enhancements to projects that will be taken
private. Second, because many open source projects improve rapidly over time, it is advantageous to have
enhancements incorporated in the free code. This eliminates the cost of re-incorporating code changes each
time a new version is released. Thus the sharing of modifications, bug fixes and enhancements is an important
part of all open source development.
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competes directly with Microsoft’s IIS server and other proprietary products (Microsoft provides
this software bundled with some versions of its Windows operating system). But despite this
competition, over 60% of active web sites use the Apache web server (Netcraft) and a major
reason is its customizability. In a usage survey of Apache security features, Franke and von Hippel
(2002) found that over 19% of the firms using Apache had modified the code for these features
themselves and another 33% customized the product by incorporating add-on security modules
available from third parties.7 Open source code facilitates the provision of add-on modules and
over 300 of these have been developed for Apache.8
Moreover, many of these private enhancements are shared with the community and
incorporated in new versions of the product. During the first three years of Apache, 388 developers
contributed 6,092 feature enhancements and fixed 695 bugs (Mockus et al, 2000). This rate of
feature enhancement far exceeds the rate for comparable commercial products (Mockus et al,
2000, Table 1).9 Thus the open source code permits Apache to meet specific users’ needs by
permitting customization, facilitating third-party add-ons, and incorporating features and fixes
from a wide range of users. The breadth and dynamism of this participation demonstrate the degree
to which open source software extends the market. The many firms who customize Apache
represent consumers whose needs are largely not met by proprietary products.10

7

Security features represent only a fraction of Apache’s total feature set, so, presumably, the total extent of

customization is even greater.
8

Apache Module Registry, http://modules.apache.org/, accessed 5/2002 with duplicates and bad records

eliminated. Open source facilitates add-on development because the source code is accessible and because
user customization helps create new add-ons. Indeed, Apache seems to have a much more active group of
add-on developers compared to Microsoft’s web server (IIS), which lists only 11 companies producing addons. See Microsoft, “IIS-Enabled Products from Industry Partners,”
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/partners/iis.asp, accessed 5/2002.
9

This dynamic process of improvement-by-user-modification also appears to raise the quality of open source

software. Kuan (2000) found evidence that complex open source projects had more effective debugging. And
Miller et al (1995) found that open source Unix operating systems were noticeably more reliable than their
commercial counterparts, even though the latter had been in use much longer.
10

Note that very little of this customization effort can be attributed to firms attempting to economize by using

a free product and then correcting deficiencies through customization. The second most popular web server,
Microsoft’s IIS, is free for users of the Windows operating system. Apache runs on Linux (free), on
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Thus the complexity of software imposes costs on the provision of pre-packaged software
that causes firms to limit the feature sets of this software, limiting the extent to which prepackaged software addresses all users’ needs. These needs can be further addressed by other
organizational arrangements including APIs and FOSS. But clearly, a realistic appraisal of
different modes of software provision has to account for a richer set of relationships between
developer and customer than is the case for simple standardized commodities.
Complexity affects the relationship between developer and customer as well, however. In
the next section I present a highly stylized model of this interaction.

A model: contracting complex software development
Consider a case where a firm wants to contract with a software developer to write some
customized software. Such contracting is notoriously difficult. Suppose that out of M possible
features, the customer can identify m features likely to be important in this custom application.
Even so, there are still a very large number of interactions between all of these features and it may
(or may not) make a big difference to the customer how each of these interactions is coded. For
example, if a word processing program determines that all of the characters in a line on the screen
will not fit on a line when output on a given printer with a given font, should the program break
the line before the last word, hyphenate the last word, squeeze the words together, squeeze the
letters together, or do something else? Such details may determine whether the program works
successfully for the customer, yet it is unlikely that the customer will be able to specify all such
details in a contract.
Although the number of “features” in a product may be difficult to enumerate, I wish to
capture the notion that the number of combinations of features grows exponentially with the
number of features. If we assume for the sake of concreteness that each feature can interact with
all other features in just two ways, then there are 2 m such interactions and it will be very costly to
write them all into a contract. Moreover, much of the work of figuring out these details is what the
customer pays the developer for. That is, typically the developer gets a general idea of how the

proprietary Unix and also on Windows. If one assumes that these operating systems are equivalent for
running web servers, then Apache offers no direct cost saving relative to IIS. Even if Linux were inferior to
Windows, but could be fixed through customization of Apache, the cost difference would be minor—the
price of Windows is $300 or less per license. Thus few firms would plausibly customize Apache to
compensate for major deficiencies in Linux.
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customer wants the program to work, then makes educated guesses about how the interactions
should be coded, and allows the customer to review and modify these decisions.
The situation can be interpreted as an instance of indescribability. In Hart and Moore’s
(1999) terminology, the customer needs a “special widget,” but is unable to specify in advance
exactly which widget it needs among a large number of widgets.
To model this interaction, I start with a version of Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) model of
innovation. In this model, the developer and the customer are risk neutral and they make
development efforts e and E, respectively. These levels of effort are not contractible so there is
moral hazard. The innovation or development project is ex ante partially indescribable; it cannot
be written in a contract that can be enforced by a court or other third party. Both parties do know,
however, that, if successful, the development has value V to the customer. Initially, the
development has no value to the developer and the developer cannot sell it to another party.
The problem is to design a contract or an allocation of property rights that elicits a socially
optimal level of e and E. An inefficient contract or rights allocation will fail to reach these levels,
resulting in a level of innovation that is less than the social optimum.
The interaction takes place in three stages: 1.) the parties draw up a contract that possibly
specifies a license fee and ownership rights, 2.) the parties invest e and E. 3.) If the development
effort is successful (which customers can determine costlessly), then the parties may choose to
renegotiate the license fee (which cannot be ruled out in the contract). Following Aghion and
Tirole and the bargaining literature, I assume that in this case, the parties split the bargaining
surplus equally. Note that the initial license fee is ultimately replaced by the “real” license fee
negotiated in stage 3. Following Aghion and Tirole, the agents are given only one chance to make
a successful innovation (e.g., the customer cannot contract for development and then, if that fails,
develop herself) and there is no time discounting.
I am interested in the interaction between firms and, as such, it is likely that the customer
may also be a developer. Although the situation where customers do not have the skills to develop
software is interesting and empirically relevant, I focus on the case where customers can develop
software. For simplicity, I assume that e and E are perfect substitutes.
The probability of success can then be written as p (e + E ) . I follow Aghion and Tirole
and assume that p is increasing and concave and p(0)=0. Also, to guarantee an interior solution,

p ′(0) is infinite and p < 1.
Given licensing fee y that is paid only in the event of success, the developer maximizes
utility p(e + E ) y − e and the customer maximizes utility p (e + E )(V − y ) − E .
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Consider contracts that assign ownership of the code to one party or the other. First, if the
customer owns the code, then under the optimal contract all development will be performed by the
customer (e = 0), that is, this describes the case of “self-development.” The customer exerts effort
E* which maximizes its utility:
(1)

E* :

max[ p ( E ) V − E ] .
E

This is a socially efficient level of effort.
On the other hand, if the developer owns the rights to the code, then, if the development
effort is successful, the parties bargain in stage 3 and each receives V 2 . Considering this, in stage
2, the Nash equilibrium is one where each party maximizes their utility holding the other party’s
effort fixed:
(2)

max p (e + E )
e

V
− e and
2

max p (e + E )
E

V
−E .
2

Straightforward calculation shows that this form of proprietary provision yields a level of effort
below the social optimum. Moreover, the customer makes out better under self-development.
So in this simple case, customers will choose to self-develop rather than to contract and
self-development is socially efficient, but contracting is not. If one takes this as a stylized model of
the early software industry, it suggests that the only firms that contracted for software development
were firms that could not develop the software themselves.
Note that in this setting I have assumed that the customer can choose the initial assignment
of ownership rights. This would be the case with copyright and trade secrecy protection, but not
necessarily with patents. The developer could unilaterally patent an essential software concept,
guaranteeing ownership in stage one prior to development of the code.11 Then the developer could
insist on contracting, resulting in socially inefficient proprietary development. That is, in this
setting, patent rights may actually decrease innovation. In what follows, I develop the model
assuming only copyright and trade secrecy rights, but I comment on effects of patents below.

11

I assume here that a patent can be obtained without actual development of the code, consistent with court

recent decisions on enablement.
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III. Improving Proprietary Provision
Pre-packaged software
The social inefficiency of contracting (or of an initial allocation of property rights to the
developer with no contract) may be seen as an instance of a more general result obtained by
Aghion and Tirole. They point out that this result depends on the indispensability of the customer,
that is, there is only one customer for this product. If there were more customers, then two things
might improve the incentives for the developer: first, the developer may gain bargaining power in
the stage three negotiation. In typical bargaining models with an outside option, the ability of the
developer to stop bargaining with one prospective customer and switch to another gives the
developer leverage. Second, if the developer can sell the same code to multiple customers (i.e.,
they are not competitors wanting exclusivity), then the incentives for proprietary development may
be larger than for self-development (ignoring the possibility of self-developers also selling a
proprietary product).
So an institution that allowed multiple customers for a single development effort might
yield greater social welfare. One might suppose, in fact, that pre-packaged software corresponds to
just this case. But there is a potential logical inconsistency with such an interpretation. How can a
developer know that there are, say, N customers for a specific product? If a developer cannot know
the “special widget” customer A needs, how can the developer know that customers B and C also
need the same special widget? This seems implausible. Even if the developer knows that A, B, and
C are in the same general line of business, this does not mean that all aspects of the software will
be identical; each firm will likely have highly idiosyncratic needs.
On the other hand, it does seem that the developer might be able to obtain some knowledge
about demand for certain groups of features without necessarily knowing ex ante all of the specific
details needed to satisfy that group of customers. For instance, a developer might guess that color
printers might be useful features to add to computer systems (with the associated software support)
without necessarily knowing all the details of how color printers might interact with other
components of the software system. Moreover, a developer might plausibly build a prototype and
test market the general appeal of such a system, again, without necessarily working out all the
details in advance. Thus the developer can know the expected demand for a product with m
features, but this product can be used in 2 m different ways—that is, it has 2 m different useproducts—and the developer does not know the demand or the customer identities for each of
these. This is, of course, a highly stylized treatment. In reality, developers are likely to have some
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information that some combinations of features may be more highly desired. Nevertheless, this
captures the difficulty that firms have in managing complex interactions between features, as
described in the Microsoft example above.
I model this limited knowledge formally as follows: a developer knows ex ante the
expected number of customers, N, who will want a use-product involving the first m features
(ranked in order of demand) of the M possible features. The developer does not know ex ante the
specific use-product each of these customers wants; the developer just knows the total expected
number of customers wanting use-products in the group using those m features. I assume that

N = N (m) includes the number of customers who want combinations of anywhere from 0 to m of
the first m features. This is thus an increasing function and, since the features are ranked in order
of their popularity, there are diminishing returns relative to the number of use-products, that is,

d2 N
< 0, u ≡ 2 m .
d u2
Pre-packaged software can then be interpreted as a strategy to develop all of the useproducts created by combinations of the first m features. This can be compared to selfdevelopment in a revised version of the model. In this version, I change the stage timing slightly.
Now, in the first stage, the software developer decides a level of effort, e, and a number of package
features, m. In the second stage, prospective customers observe whether the package successfully
addresses their use-product and they decide to exert a level of effort, E, at self-development. If
self-development fails, then customers still have the option to purchase the product at price w in
stage 3. I also explored a model where the customer’s decision to self-develop is made
simultaneously with the developer’s allocation decision in stage one. As long as the market is large
enough, I find the main results of that model to be the same as the results of this model. Since this
model is simpler to develop and because it provides a slightly more challenging problem for the
software developer, I use this version in the exposition.
To complete the model, I specify several other details. Customers derive varying levels of
utility, Vi , from their respective use-products. Let Vi be distributed according to a distribution
function F (⋅) over support 0 < Vi ≤ V without gaps. As before, each customer receives zero
utility from other use-products. I assume that Vi is uncorrelated with the number of features the
customer desires. If these were correlated, then the firm could engage in “versioning,” providing
different versions of the software package (with some features disabled) to some customers at a
different price. For simplicity, I leave such considerations for future research.
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Of course, the more features included in a product, the greater the development effort
required. To capture this notion, interpret e (or E) as the intensity of effort expended over a given
number of tasks. Let the number of tasks increase with the number of use-products supported.

(

Thus the developer’s disutility for developing a product with m features is e ⋅ c 0 + c 2 m

)

where

c0 represents the tasks associated with initially coding the product, including each the initial
coding of each feature, and c represents the tasks associated with debugging and maintaining each
use-product. In a more realistic model, the disutility of initial coding might increase with the
number of features, m. Adding this source of variation makes the model more complicated without,
however, affecting the basic insights; keeping c 0 constant captures the basic intuition that
debugging and maintenance costs will substantially exceed the costs of initial coding. Given this
assumption, a customer developing just a single use-product faces a disutility of E ⋅ (c 0 + c ) .
I assume that only a single firm develops a software package for the given market. With
Bertrand competition, no rival would choose to enter the market with the same package of features.
Competing firms might choose to develop different bundles of features, perhaps overlapping the
first firm’s feature set to some extent. This may give rise to a “features war,” but such
considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
Given this, the firm will set a package price, w, in the third stage by solving a monopoly
pricing problem, assuming zero marginal cost to reproduce software and assuming that the firm
cannot price discriminate. Let G(w) represent the share of prospective customers for whom

Vi > w and who have not successfully self-developed in stage 2. Then the firm’s optimal price is
(3)

wˆ = arg max[w ⋅ G ( w)] .
w

Note that the firm cannot credibly commit to a different price in stage two.
The function G depends on the distribution F and the customers’ decisions about selfdevelopment in stage two. If Vi ≤ w or if the pre-packaged software does not successfully address
the customer’s application, then a customer has no alternative but to self-develop with expected
net utility of
(4)

C
π self
(Vi ) = max[ p ( E ) Vi − E ⋅ (c 0 + c )] .
E

If, on the other hand, Vi > w and the package does address the customer’s application, the
customer will still choose to exert some effort at self-development, and then purchase in stage
three if this is not successful. In this case, the customer’s optimal effort is
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Eˆ ( w) = arg max[ p ( E ) Vi + (1 − p ( E ) )(Vi − w) − E ⋅ (c0 + c)], Vi > w

(5)

E

Note that this effort is independent of the customer’s individual valuation as long as Vi > w . This
means that

(

(

))

G ( w) = (1 − F ( w) ) 1 − p Eˆ ( w) .

(6)

ˆ < V . Also, note that Ê is strictly positive (although
It is then straightforward to show that 0 < w
it may be quite small if c 0 is large), so that all customers exert at least some minimal effort at self
development.12
The pre-packaged software firm then maximizes expected profits:
D
π pkg
= max[ p (e) N (m) wˆ G ( wˆ ) − e ⋅ (c0 + c 2 m )]

(7)

e,m

where e* and m* are the level of effort and the number of features at the maximum. It is
straightforward to show that this profit function is concave, however, m* may take a corner
solution, m* = M or an interior solution, 0 < m* < M . Also, e*>0.
There are two main reasons why a customer might choose not to purchase the software

ˆ ), or because the product is too simple,
package: because the price is too high ( Vi < w
( m* < m ).13 If a customer firm does purchase the packaged product, then they receive greater
utility than from self-development from scratch, so in this case, efficiency is enhanced. From this it
follows:
Proposition 1. Pre-packaged software improves social allocation of effort over what can be
achieved by self-development or contract programming. However, this is not true for all
potential customers. In particular, low value customers (low Vi ) and customers with complex
applications (high m) will choose self-development over purchasing pre-packaged software.

12

This behavior depends on the initial assumption that

p ′(0) = ∞ . With some initial non-convexity in p,

the effort exerted at self-development may be zero.
13

Also, it may happen that a customer who can afford the package happens to be successful self-developing

in stage two. Note, however, that if

(

)

c0 is large, then this is unlikely (that is, p Eˆ ( wˆ ) will be small) and, as

noted, customers may exert zero effort if p’ is finite.

15 – Open Source – 8/04
Remark 1: By taking the implicit derivative of (7), it is easy to show that m* increases with
the magnitude of N. This provides a simple explanation as to why pre-packaged software was not
widely used during the early decades of computing and why the market share of pre-packaged
software has been associated with the tremendous growth in the overall size of the software market
accompanying low cost personal computers.
Remark 2: This kind of bundling of features into a single product to serve heterogeneous
customers occurs, of course, with all sorts of other goods. For example, automobiles are sold with
many options effectively built in to their production (although not necessarily included in the
version each customer purchases). Two characteristics may make this issue particularly important
for software. First, software products tend to be quite complex, that is, M is quite large and likely
to exceed m*. Second, trade secrecy of source code means that customers of pre-packaged
software are not free to modify the product. This is not so for many physical goods, e.g., cars can
be modified without special rights from the manufacturer. To the extent that other goods share
these characteristics with software, much of the analysis applies to these goods as well as to
software.

Proprietary extensions
Once a pre-packaged software product is successfully established, then secondary
possibilities for greater social efficiency arise. This is because software code developed for the
pre-packaged product can be reused. That is, the monopolist has already coded a basic product
associated with effort e * ⋅c 0 . If this code can be reused, then the development effort necessary for
a custom application that incorporates some or all of these coded features is less. In this new
setting, assuming that a successful pre-packaged software product already exists, let the additional
disutility of effort needed for a custom application be only e ⋅ c ext or E ⋅ c ext , depending on who
performs the work. The socially optimal level of effort to customize a use-product not included in
the software package is
(8)

E* :

arg max[ p ( E ) Vi − E ⋅ cext ] .
E

This is larger than the effort exerted under self-development from scratch in (4) as long as

cext < c0 + c , which one would expect.
Two proprietary forms of provision allow a pre-packaged software monopolist to reuse
code: the monopolist might contract individually with individual customers in addition to
providing a software package, and the monopolist might offer a developer’s toolkit supporting an
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API. Both of these devices allow the monopolist to better address the needs of those prospective
customers whose needs are too complex for the pre-packaged product.
Consider individual contracts first. As before, the specification of the use-product is ex
ante indescribable and, as a result, the parties split the bargaining surplus in stage 3. The
monopolist’s effort toward a custom project utilizing this base code is the value of e that
maximizes

p (e)

(9)

Vi
− e ⋅ cext .
2

By comparison with (4), the monopolist’s effort under a custom contract will exceed the
customer’s effort at self development as long as c 0 + c > 2 c ext , although this is still less than the
socially optimal level of effort. Moreover, the customer’s expected utility under a custom contract,

p (e)

Vi
, may be greater or less than the customer’s utility from self development given in (4).
2

Consequently, the customer may or may not choose to contract with the monopolist.
Another approach is for the monopolist to sell a developer’s toolkit to access an
application program interface (API). Let the monopolist’s price for the toolkit be w API . The
customer will then realize a gross profit
(10)

C
π API
(Vi ) = max[ p ( E ) Vi − E ⋅ cext ]
E

C
and a net profit of π API
(Vi ) − w API . The monopolist will choose a revenue maximizing price,

ŵ API , and at this price, some customers will purchase the developer’s toolkit and some will selfdevelop from scratch. Those customers who do choose to purchase the toolkit will exert a socially
optimal level of effort that exceeds the effort of the monopolist under a custom contract or of the
customer developing entirely from scratch. Thus,
Proposition 2. For prospective customers whose applications are too complex to be handled
by a pre-packaged software product, a software monopolist can offer a custom programming
contract or a developer’s toolkit with associated API. These alternatives provide some of
these customers a more profitable and socially efficient alternative to developing the software
themselves from scratch. However, not all such prospective customers will be able to
profitably take advantage of these alternatives.
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IV. Free/Open Source Software
Socially optimal customization
These extensions to pre-packaged software work because they permit the reuse of base
code incorporated in the packaged product, represented by c 0 . Either the monopolist, in the case
of contract programming, or the customer, in the case using the API, is required to exert less effort
than if the customer were developing their software from scratch.
Once a Free/Open Source project is established, it, too, has a core of code that can be used
by firms seeking to build customized solutions. It is like an API, but one available at a price of
zero (and some important strings attached). Suppose, for example, that a FOSS project has coded
C
C
the same m* features as in the pre-packaged software product. Then π FOSS
(Vi ) = π API
(Vi ) , but

with no additional charge to the customer as with the API. Clearly, in this case, no customer is
priced out of the market, so the efficiency gains of the API are available to all customers with
complex applications. FOSS thus further improves the provision of software.

~ features. Suppose that a
More generally, suppose a FOSS project has coded m
prospective customer (prospective FOSS developer) needs just one additional feature. Let the
disutility for that customer to code and debug one additional feature to the FOSS product be

E ⋅ c FOSS , given intensity of effort, E. Then
(11)

C
π FOSS
(Vi ) = max[ p ( E ) Vi − E ⋅ c FOSS ] .
E

~ ≥ m * , it must be true that c
For consistency, if m
FOSS ≤ c ext . From this it follows,
Proposition 3. Given a Free/Open Source software project that has developed a code base
~ ≥ m * , complex applications with m > m*, will be developed with greater socially
m
efficiency under Free/Open Source development than by a combination of a pre-packaged
software product and custom programming, by a combination of a pre-packaged software
product and a developer’s toolkit, or by customer self-development.

Growth and viability of FOSS
This, of course, begs the question of whether and how a FOSS project can build such an
initial code base. The main focus of this paper is on the existence and robustness of FOSS once it
has begun. Still, the model suggests several points about its initial growth. First, FOSS
development does not require a large initial code base. Consider a FOSS project where, say,
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~ << m * . As long as some prospective customer can make use of a product with m
~ + 1 features,
m
then this code base allows this customer to efficiently develop by coding just one additional
feature. And since that customer then returns the code for the additional feature to the shared
resource, the code base for other prospective customers grows by one feature. Another FOSS
developer may then add another additional feature, and so on. FOSS development can thus begin
with a code base that is much smaller than m*, and yet that code base can grow to something much
larger than m*, ultimately allowing much more efficient development of complex applications.
Note, however, that this argument assumes that no pre-packaged software product is on the
market. With a pre-packaged software product on the market, some prospective FOSS developers
may choose to purchase the package rather than to participate in FOSS development. There are at
least three reasons, however, why the alternative of a pre-packaged software product might not
prevent the initiation and evolution of a robust FOSS alternative:
1. Some customers will find the monopoly price for the software package too high. As I
show below, a monopolist will charge a lower price for a pre-packaged software product when
faced with a competing FOSS project. Nevertheless, some prospective customers will be priced
out of the market and will choose to participate in FOSS development instead.
2. FOSS may have an advantage in small markets and/or markets where the initial
development effort required to create a useful product is not large. As discussed below, prepackaged software may not be sustainable in such markets. Moreover, it is often the case that the
initial market for a new technology begins quite small and can be addressed with simple products,
but as the technology improves the market grows rapidly. This growth is a staple of industry lifecycle studies and studies of “disruptive technologies” (Utterback, 1996, Christensen, 1997). In
these cases, FOSS may get started earlier in the product life-cycle and may become well-developed
before proprietary competitors enter. This describes, for example, the development of web
browsers and web servers. In effect, the historical path of development may provide an advantage
to FOSS development.
3. Especially for small markets and small projects, the personal motivations of individual
programmers may come into play and provide additional incentive to develop a FOSS project even
though a commercial alternative is available. An example of this is Linux, which began as a
personal project of Linus Torvalds using as a code base Minix, written by Andrew Tanenbaum as a
teaching aid (Moody, 2001).
Two other factors might work against the early stages of FOSS development: if a
prospective customer expects that other prospective customers might volunteer to code an initial
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project, then free-riding may give rise to some inefficiency as in Johnson (2000). Nevertheless,
free-riding does not prevent the possibility of successful FOSS projects; it just diminishes the
probability of success.
Second, software patents, especially obvious software patents, may prevent FOSS
development. As noted above, software patents that cover a generic concept may limit the range of
feasible contractual arrangements and such is the case here (FOSS is a form contracting after all).
Note, however, that such generic patents are also a problem for pre-packaged software producers
(albeit they may have more resources to litigate them), and forms of insurance are emerging for
open source.14
In general, then, there is good reason to anticipate the emergence and growth of future
FOSS projects. Moreover, these projects can grow even in the presence of a competing prepackaged software product.

Coexistence
But will a successful FOSS project drive a pre-packaged software product from the
market? Not necessarily.
First, note that even when a relatively sophisticated FOSS project is developed, many
prospective customers may still prefer to purchase a competing pre-packaged software product.

~ ≥ m * , this does not mean that the FOSS project has developed support for
Even though, say, m
all 2 m* use-products supported by the pre-packaged software firm. So these customers (quite
possibly the vast majority of prospective customers) are faced with a choice of purchasing the prepackaged product or customizing the FOSS code at a disutility of E ⋅ c FOSS .
Following the treatment for self-development above, the market for the pre-packaged
product in stage three includes those customers who can afford price w, whose needs are met by
the pre-packaged product, and who have not self-developed successfully in stage 2. These
prospective customers will exert the following effort in stage two:
(12)

~
E ( w) = arg max[ p ( E ) Vi + (1 − p ( E ) )(Vi − w) − E ⋅ c FOSS ],
E

Then the monopolist’s optimal price is
(13)

~ = arg max[w ⋅ H ( w)],
w
w

14

(

(

~
H ( w) = (1 − F ( w) ) 1 − p E ( w)

See Open Source Risk Management, http://www.osriskmanagement.com/.

Vi > w

))
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and maximum profit is
(14)

D
~ H (w
~ ) − e ⋅ (c + c 2 m )]
π pkg
= max[ p (e) N (m) w
0
e, m

It is then straightforward to show that the monopolist will exert a positive effort, so,
Proposition 4. A pre-packaged software monopolist and a FOSS project can coexist, both
exerting positive effort.
Proof: The partial derivative of the expression within brackets with respect to e is positive and
infinite at e=0.15

As in the case where the alternative is self-development, two groups of customers will
choose FOSS over the pre-packaged product: those with simple needs ( m ≤ m * ) but low

~ , and those with complex needs, m > m * . Since the first
valuations who are unwilling to pay w
group is composed of low valuation customers, they will exert a relatively low level of effort E*
on FOSS development. The second group will exert greater effort. In effect, FOSS development
will be concentrated on relatively complex applications.
The monopolist will charge a lower price in this scenario than in (7) because

~
Eˆ ( w) < E ( w) since c0 + c > c FOSS . The corresponding values of e* and m* will be lower. So
there will be some reduction in the probability of success of the pre-packaged software. This,
however, may be more than offset by the welfare gains of those customers who choose to
participate in FOSS development. Note that FOSS will displace use of an API in conjunction with
a pre-packaged software product.
Remark. The model I have developed here ignores customers who are not developers. In
the current setting, such users would only be able to use the FOSS product if a FOSS developer
happened to implement their specific use-products. In the region m ≤ m * , this might not happen,
especially since FOSS developers in this region have low valuations and exert low effort. Then the
addition of non-developing customers to the model has the effect of increasing demand for the prepackaged software product, causing the monopolist to raise the price and exert more effort. This
also causes more developers to choose FOSS development in the region m ≤ m * .

15

This result depends on the assumption that p ′(0) is infinite. If p ′(0) were, instead, finite, then the same

result would still hold as long as N is sufficiently large, that is, in a large market.
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V. Conclusion
This analysis may help dispel two myths about Free/Open Source software. First, it is not
a “communistic,” “property destroying” alternative to proprietary software. It is better viewed as a
complement to proprietary provision, recognizing that proprietary provision fails to effectively
meet the needs of many customers in markets where customers have highly disparate needs and
products are complex. Free/Open Source software and proprietary provision of pre-packaged
software can both exist in a market, recognizing that they mainly serve different groups of
customers. Free/Open Source will be most used by firms who have their own development
capability and who have complex, specialized needs; pre-packaged software will be used by firms
with simpler needs and by firms who lack development capabilities. The addition of Free/Open
Source software to a market with a pre-existing packaged software product may reduce the
monopolist’s profits and may limit the monopolist’s market for developer’s toolkits, but this
should not drive the monopolist out of the market.
Second, it is a mistake to assume that FOSS is somehow less robust because it is based on
voluntary contributions rather than driven by the profit incentive. In fact, the firms that participate
in FOSS are driven by the profit incentive—FOSS is just the most socially efficient means for
many of them to obtain the software they need in their profit-making activities. Managers need to
view FOSS as an alternative to simple “make-or-buy.” This alternative will make the most sense
for firms with specialized and complex needs. And it may be especially important in emerging
technologies where markets are initially small.
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Figure 1. Packaged Software Share of All Software Investment
Source: Parker and Grimm (2000)
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